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ARGUMENT
L

JARED WILSON NEITHER AGREED TO NOR WAIVED IHC'S
VIOLATIONS OF THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE.
As often occurs when a party seeks to maintain an unsupportable position, IHC's

alleged justifications for its repeated violations of the collateral source rule continue to
change. Initially, IHC claimed that it was not referring to medical expenses (R 0620).
Subsequently, it claimed that the jury had a right to know that Jared would be taken care
of even if they did not award him a verdict (R 2782:15-24). Later, it claimed that
"evidence relating to insurance benefits received in the past is always admissible . . ." (R.
8203 (Utah Valley Regional Medical Center's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion for New Trial, p. 8.)) Then, for the first time, IHC claimed in oral argument on
Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial that it was the plaintiff, not the defendant, who wanted
to present evidence of insurance covering Jared Wilson (R 8622, April 20, 2009 hearing
on Motion for New Trial, p. 41).1 Now, for the first time, IHC contends in its brief
before this court that Jared agreed to the, "exact structure and procedures followed during
the trial with respect to collateral source references." (See Appellee's Brief, p. 20.)
It is certainly telling that there have been approximately 20 occasions since this
agreement was allegedly reached on the second day of trial, where Respondent's

1

"We didn't put on any evidence of insurance. We didn't put on any evidence of
Medicaid or Medicare in the future, no evidence of anything was there..." (p. 41.) It was
the plaintiff who continued to want to get the evidence of insurance into the record in
spite of it being their motion that the insurance not be entered. Id Counsel also referred
to the 17 different references to the lack of out-of-pocket expenses as "minimal." (pp. 4041.)
1

collateral source rule violations have been raised by Wilson and yet this is the first time
that the existence of an alleged agreement has been claimed by IHC.
In light of this new allegation, a review of what actually occurred may be helpful.
On September 5, 2008, the plaintiff filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude IHC
from introducing evidence or making statements suggesting or imply iag the existence of
insurance coverage for payment of past, present, or future health care costs under the
collateral source rule. (R 5414-5419.) That motion was granted at a pre-trial conference
held on October 23, 2008. (Hearing Transcript, p. 23.) Nevertheless, during IHCs cross
examination of the first trial witness, Jerome Wilson, the following occurred:
Q:

A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

Now, we have your medical expenses, but we don't
have the amount that you paid for out of pocket
expenses.
So I'm going to ask you some specific
questions.
And that is, I notice that Jared had a wheelchair
as he came in here today?
Yes.
And it was a special wheelchair?
Yes.
How much of that did you pay out of your pocket?
None. We have both -MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your honor, I'm going to object
to this as a direct violation of the court's
order.
(WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING WAS HEARD AT THE BENCH,
OUTSIDE OF THE HEARING OF THE JURY.)
THE COURT: Just let me ask you a question. Did
you
have
a
stipulation
about
the
medical
expenses?
MR. DAHLQUIST: Its not the medical expenses that
I'm asking about.
THE COURT: About the out-of-pocket.
MR. DAHLQUIST: I'm asking the out-of-pocket.
THE COURT: I understood. What's the arrangement
regarding the expenses?
MR. CHRISTENSEN: You've ruled that --

2

THE COURT:
L e t me a s k you t h i s .
How do you
i n t e n d t o e n t e r them? What do you i n t e n d ?
MR. CHRISTENSEN:
W e ' r e s t i l l w o r k i n g w i t h them
on t h e s t i p u l a t i o n .
MR. DAHLQUIST: We h a v e n ' t - - w e h a v e n ' t h a d a n y .
We've a s k e d them f o r o u t - o f - p o c k e t e x p e n s e s .
MR. CHRISTENSEN:
We s t i l l d o n ' t h a v e them.
And
I have t h e - THE COURT:
A r e you i n t e n d i n g
to offer
a
different witness?
MR. CHRISTENSEN:
W e l l , he i s , I t h i n k , m i s u n d e r standing the question.
And t h a t may b e - THE COURT: L e t me a s k you t h i s .
MR. DAHLQUIST:
I t h i n k Roger i s r i g h t .
His
o b j e c t i o n i s t h e i n s u r a n c e i s s u e , a n d we c o u l d n ' t
agree more.
I agree with t h a t .
THE COURT:
I guess the question I s t i l l d o n ' t
u n d e r s t a n d i s , what w i t n e s s a r e you g o i n g t o u s e
to e n t e r out-of-pocket expenses?
MR. CHRISTENSEN:
We're n o t c l a i m i n g
out-ofpockets.
We h a v e n ' t k e p t r e c o r d s , a n d s o w e ' r e
not c l a i m i n g them.
THE COURT: Then I t h i n k i t ' s i r r e l e v a n t .
(R 8605, Tr. pp. 0619-0621.) (emphasis added)
Nevertheless, IHC continued with that witness, as well as on numerous other
occasions outlined in Appellant's Brief to circumvent the collateral source rule.
In light of the fact that an order in limine had been issued barring suggestions or
implications of insurance, both the court and Jared's counsel were ambushed by this
approach.

Counsel then immediately drove the point, i.e. the existence of health

insurance, home again. (R 8605, Tr. pp. 0623-0624.) {See also Appellant's Brief, pp. 1722.)
Under these circumstances, i.e., this was Jared's father and the first witness of the
trial, a clear message was sent, more than once, that the Wilsons had insurance, with the
jury watching a bench conference that could only have served to highlight the message.

3

The plaintiff was then on the horns of a dilemma. The jury knew that Jared had a multimillion dollar damage claim, but had just seen Jared5 s father seemingly admit that there
were no past economic damages. Accordingly, Jared9s counsel was forced to choose
between two prejudicial choices: Either have the jury believe that the Wilsons and their
counsel were dishonest and were attempting to mislead the jury into giving them a huge
verdict for unsustained damages (a fatal prejudice in any case), or to change course and
offer evidence to explain this apparent critical discrepancy. Having relied in good faith
on the court's order and the expectation of compliance by IHC, Jared was irreparably
placed in the position of being caught in a seeming lie. By IHC's violation of the rules,
Jared was forced to choose between two evils. The lesser of the two was to explain the
discrepancy. Consequently, on redirect the following occurred:
Q.

A.
Q.

I think we need to clarify an area. You were
asked about out-of-pocket expenses. Have the bulk
of Jaredfs medical expenses been paid by health
insurance or Medicaid?
Yes.
And is it your understanding -THE COURT: Just a minute, Mr. Christensen. If
you f 11 approach please.
(WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING WAS HEARD AT THE BENCH,
OUTSIDE OF THE HEARING OF THE JURY.)

THE COURT: Don f t we have an order about excluding
references to insurance?
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, we have got to go into it
now.
MR. DAHLQUIST: That was your offer.
MR. CHRISTENSEN: We f ve got to go into it now.
MR. DAHLQUIST: We've got a ruling.
MR. CHRISTENSEN: He's created a false impression
that -MR. DAHLQUIST: Oh, heaven.
THE COURT: No, I -MR. DAHLQUIST: And you've agreed to it. I think
we need to keep that out.

4

MR. CHRISTENSEN: We've got - - w e have -MR. DAHLQUIST: I think it violates the
order.
MR. CHRISTENSEN: It is not. He•s created the
false impression now that they don't have -there's not a financial issue here.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: They need to know now that there
are lien interests in this, in part because there
THE COURT: There are what?
MR. CHRISTENSEN: There are lien interests for the
records [sic] that have been paid. And those
notices have been given. Those are part of the -THE COURT: No, I'm not going to allow that. No.
MR. DAHLQUIST: Okay.
THE COURT: Okay.

(R 8605, Tr. pp. 0652-0654.)
A few minutes later the jury was excluded and an additional record was made. As
part of that conference, Jared's counsel explained (R 8605, Tr. p. 0657):
And this is the problem. The false impression has now been created to this
jury that the Wilson's, and particularly Jared, are on a free ride without
expense. That is not true. By law, Medicaid has a lien, and so does Blue
Cross, and any other health insurer on this recovery.
Counsel explained that the plaintiff was probably now going to have to call the
Medicaid people and the Blue Cross people to give testimony concerning their liens. The
court then made the observation that, "the false impression is going to be resolved with
the presence of that evidence." (R 8605, Tr. p. 0659.) In response, Jared's counsel

5

stated, "that's fine. If we can present it through the Blue Cross and Medicaid people,
then that's fine." (R 8605, Tr. p. 0659.)2
What IHC is now claiming to have been an agreement by the plaintiff to IHC's
violation of the collateral source rule was in fact Jared's attempt to deal with the mess
that had been created by IHC's repeated violations of the collateral source rule and the
order in limine, as well as the trial court's erroneous ruling allowing the prejudice that
had occurred. The proverbial bell had been rung; it could not be unrung, and Jared had
been prejudiced. This was simply counsel's effort, on the fly, to try to contain the
prejudice. Even then, the court ruled that it would not allow Mr. Wilson to explain the
misleading impression that had been created for the jury. (R 8605, Tr. p. 0661.)
In direct contradiction of IHC's current assertion that Jared agreed to its violation
of the collateral source rule and order in limine on the second day of trial, plaintiff
continued objecting to such violation throughout the trial up to and including closing
arguments. (See Appellant's Brief, pp. 19-22.) Furthermore, as IHC's prejudicial actions
continued, Jared's counsel was compelled to move for a mistrial. (R 8611, Tr. p. 1613-

2

Clearly counsel was not saying that what had occurred was "fine," but was simply
acknowledging the court's direction as to how such evidence should be presented.
Subsequently, the trial court obviated the need for calling the lienholders as live
witnesses by instructing the jury that liens existed (R 8621, Tr. p. 3761-3762), but such
instruction could not rectify the damage already done, and the whole issue of insurance,
lienholders, etc., would never have been presented to the jury but for IHC's violation of
the pretrial order.

6

1648.)

On none of these occasions did Respondent assert that there had been an

agreement by the Appellant for what was occurring.
Where a party has acted timely to exclude improper evidence (by motion in limine
or objection), that party does not waive its appellate rights or agree to the improper
admission of the evidence, by its subsequent efforts to address the prejudicial evidence.
{State of Utah v. Saunders, 992 P.2d 951 (Utah 1999).)
In Saunders the defendant had made a pre-trial motion in limine asking the trial
court to exclude evidence of the defendant's misconduct in 1991. That motion was
denied and the prosecution raised the alleged 1991 misconduct at trial.

On direct

examination, Saunders discussed the evidence he had previously attempted to exclude.
On appeal, the prosecution argued that he had waived his position and had "opened the
door." In rendering its decision, this Court held:
Saunders clearly was entitled, indeed required as a practical matter, to rebut
or explain that evidence by his testimony. To say that defendant "opened
the door" and therefore was responsible for the admission of the 1991
evidence, as the state contends, is patently incorrect. The trial court and the
Court of Appeals both fell into palpable error in so ruling.
Id at 958.
This court also explained:
A defendant need not forego rebutting improperly admitted evidence to
preserve his objection to that evidence. In State v. Span, this Court stated,
3

The trial court's comments at the hearing on the Motion for New Trial (R 8622)
certainly do not support the notion that there was an agreement referring to the collateral
source rule violation issue. The court said "And Fve concluded that I don't like it and I
don't like what's happened but — this might be a matter of criticism by the appellate
court. . ." (p. 78.) The court also acknowledged that it was "caught off guard" by the
references to out-of-pocket expenses and the potential implications of insurance, (p. 78.)
7

"it would be unfair for a prosecutor to question the witness on prohibited
information or issues, but then require the defendant to forego crossexamination, which would ameliorate the damage caused, to preserve an
objection to the prosecutor's misconduct." (citation omitted)
Id. at 959.
Saunders is consistent with the decisions from other jurisdictions in civil cases.
Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1346 (Cal. 1991) ("an attorney who
submits to the authority of an erroneous, adverse ruling, after making appropriate
objections or motions, does not waive the error in the ruling by proceeding in accordance
therewith and endeavoring to make the best of a bad situation for which he was not
responsible"); McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corporation, 23 P.3d 320, 327 (Or. 2001) ("A
party has the right to meet its opponent's evidence admitted under the trial court's ruling.
After making the proper objections, a party may counter its opponents evidence, whether
correctly admitted or not, without waiving its evidentiary objection on appeal.");
Scurlock Oil Co, v. Smithwick, 724 SW.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1986) ("Having properly objected,
[a party is] not required to sit idly by and take its chances on appeal or retrial when
incompetent evidence [is] admitted. . . [a party is] entitled to defendant's help by
explaining, rebutting or demonstrating the untruthfulness of objectionable evidence
without waiving its objection."); Stong v. Freeman Truckline Inc., 456 So.2d 698, 711
(Miss. 1984) ("[W]here a party requests a correct instruction only to have it refused by
the trial judge, that party does not, by requesting another instruction, bowing to the
judge's ruling, waive the right to assign his error on appeal of the refusal of the correct
instruction. . . . and, when the litigant reaches this Court, we will not imply a waiver from

8

the subsequent conduct which does nothing more than show the lawyer's obligatory
respect for the trial judge while at the same time continuing as best can be done the
advancement of his client's case.").
Jared Wilson acted both by a pre-trial motion in limine and by trial objections to
keep the jury from hearing evidence informing the jury that Jared's medical expenses had
largely been paid by collateral sources.

However, once IHC acted improperly in

introducing such evidence and the court erroneously allowed this to occur, Jared did not
waive his appellate rights on this issue nor agree to the introduction of such evidence. In
the words of this Court in Saunders, "It would be unfair for a[n] [opposing attorney] to
question the witness on prohibited information or issues, but then require the [opposing
party] to forego cross-examination, which could ameliorate the damage caused, to
preserve an objection to the [opposing counsel's] misconduct."
In the final analysis, this is issue is simple and straightforward: Any alternative
explanations notwithstanding, IHC made the existence of collateral sources a repeated
theme at trial because it knew that by doing so, the jury would be less likely to render a
verdict against it. {See R 2782 and 3819-3820.) It is for this very reason that such
evidence has long been recognized as prejudicial and forbidden. Having succeeded in
this strategy, in spite of the plaintiffs best efforts to avoid the prejudice, it must now
accept the consequences on this appeal.

9

II.

A PARTY CANNOT AVOID AUTHENTICATED RELEVANT ADVERSE
EVIDENCE BY DENYING THAT IT EXISTS - IT WAS ERROR FOR
THE TRIAL COURT TO ALLOW APPELLEE TO DO SO.
The plaintiffs efforts to obtain the nursing modules throughout discovery and trial

are reviewed in Appellant's Brief (pp. 33-37) and will not be repeated here. By way of
summary, however, during discovery IHC designated its employee, Nurse Lisa Fullmer,
under Rule 30(b)(6) regarding the nurse training modules applicable in 1995. Fullmer
testified that she remembered such training modules (referring to 1995) relating to fetal
heart tone monitoring, and that they were on a shelf in her prior office at IHC when her
job assignment changed (Appellant's Brief, p. 35). That testimony is entirely consistent
with proposed Exhibit 36 dated October 1993. Although Ms. Fullmer was still working
in a responsible position at IHC, just before trial IHC asked the court to excuse her from
testifying at trial, claiming, among other things, that she had "physical and mental
disabilities including reduced cognition and acute memory loss." (Oct.. 23, 2008 Hearing,
pp. 185-194.) In support of this request, Appellee submitted letters from IHC doctors
(Id, p. 192).4
Now IHC cites Fullmer's self-serving trial testimony as conclusively trumping her
deposition testimony and Exhibit 36 itself (dated October 1993), which on its face states
that it is applicable to Utah Valley Regional Medical Center. (R 6437-6443.)

4

Although a transcript of the October 23, 2008, pretrial conference was ordered (R 85798580) and prepared by the court reporter, it appears to be missing from the Fourth District
Court's record. A motion to supplement the record with a copy of the transcript has been
filed simultaneously herewith.
10

At the end of footnote 18 of its brief, IHC asserts that the plaintiff never moved for
the admission of proposed Exhibit 36. However, asking the court to admit Exhibit 36,
along with Exhibits 8, 9 and 10, was the whole purpose of the hearing on November 20,
2008 (R 3446-3451). At that hearing, Exhibit 36 was referred to repeatedly. On page
3451 the court stated, "could I look at 36?" After looking at it, the court asked counsel if
they submitted the issue, whereupon it stated, "I'm persuaded they are authentic. I'm
unpersuaded there is adequate foundation."

Immediately thereafter the court said,

"Respectfully, they are not received." (TR 3451.) IHC's counsel certainly understood
that she was opposing the admission of Exhibit 36 (R 3450).5
Jared Wilson more than met the requirements for foundation and relevance, and no
Rule 403 issue was raised. Accordingly, as was pointed out at the November 20 hearing,
IHC's arguments went to weight, not admissibility (R 3450), and the jury should have
been given this critical evidence. Excluding it was an error of law.
III.

APPELLEE MISCONSTRUES BOTH BARBUTO AND APPLICABLE
LAW REGARDING A PHYSICIAN'S DUTIES OF CONFIDENTIALITY
TO HIS PATIENT.
On August 10, 2006, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its decision in Sorensen v.

Barbuto, 2006 UT App 340, 143 P.3d 295 ("Barbuto F).

The opinion stated that,

"consistent with the reasoning of DeBry, we hold that ex parte communication between a

5

In its brief, IHC also asserts that as of 1995 the nurse training on fetal heart monitoring
was done by training videos that had been produced to the Wilsons (Appellee's Brief, p.
17). In truth, the videos produced were not fetal heart monitor nurse training modules,
but irrelevant videos on the use of certain machines (not involved in this case), along with
a videotape of a presentation by Dr. Minton. (R 1187-1191.)

11

physician and opposing counsel constitutes a breach of the physician's fiduciary duty of
confidentiality."

Id. at 300.

"[I]n addition, the prohibition extends beyond the

termination of medical treatment and applies with equal force to a plaintiffs current and
former treating doctors." Id. Noting that patients cannot be assured that their rights will
be adequately protected without notice, Barbuto I required the use of court-authorized
discovery methods, rather than ex parte contact with the patient's adversary. Id. at 301.
On February 1, 2008, this Court affirmed Barbuto I in Sorensen v. Barbuto, 177
P.3d 614 (Utah 2008) {"Barbuto IF).

In rejecting a contention that Barbuto I had

imposed some new fiduciary duty upon physicians, this court found that the duty
recognized in Barbuto I was not new. On the contrary,
[a] physician's duty of confidentiality encompasses the broad principle that
prohibits a physician from disclosing information received through the
physician-patient relationship.
The duty is rooted in the ethical
underpinnings of this relationship and serves to prevent a physician from
disclosing sensitive medical information to any third party. It arises from
the understanding that good medical care requires a patient's trust and
confidence that disclosures to physicians will be used solely for the
patient's welfare and that a patient's privacy with regard to those
disclosures will be respected and protected.
Id. 617.
The Barbuto court was not insensitive to the legitimate need for confidential
medical information in litigation. "Making this information available through formal
methods of discovery strikes a balance between enabling the patient to protect
confidential medical information that has no relevance to the civil action and providing
the patient's adversary access to information that is relevant to a condition placed at issue
in the case," the Court observed. Id. at 620.
12

"[W]e agree that ex parte communications between a treating physician and
counsel opposing the patient should be prohibited because such communications are
destructive to the relationship that exists between a physician and a patient," the Court
concluded. Id. Barbuto II also expressly barred attorneys from participating in such ex
parte communications. Id. at 621.
In light of the clear prohibition in Barbuto I and II, it is both puzzling and
concerning that IHC's counsel, after August 10, 2006, and even up through trial, would
conduct ex parte meetings with Jared Wilson's doctors without notice to Jared (through
counsel), and without seeking direction from the court. IHC's suggestion that Jared's
failure to anticipate and prevent its disregard of Barbuto constituted a waiver has no basis
in law or public policy. Moreover, the undisputed evidence in this case is that even after
Jared's attorneys realized, during the trial, that such meetings were taking place; and even
after strenuous objections were made to the court; and even after the court had sanctioned
IHC for such meetings, they continued.6
A.

There is no blanket "employee" exception to Barbuto.

As noted above, the prohibition against ex parte meetings between a patient's
doctor and the patient's adversary is based on the sanctity of the patient / physician
relationship. Suggesting that this fundamental concern may be disregarded whenever an
employer / employee relationship exists does not square with the principles underlying

6

After Dr. Minton was excluded due to the ex parte meetings, counsel began having them
with his partner, Dr. Stoddard, preparing him to take Dr. Minton's place as an adverse
expert witness against his own patient. (R 3154, 3482.)
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the Barbuto decisions. Sound public policy requires an organization's business model
and policies to comport with the law, not the other way around.
IHC would have Utah law in this context view a physician-employee no
differently than a parking services employee, a maintenance engineer, a collections
manager, or any other employee.

IHC's contention would eviscerate the Barbuto

protections in the medical malpractice context.
The practice of medicine, like the practice of law, is a profession requiring the
utmost duties of loyalty and confidentiality to the patient. Practitioners involved in those
few professions which have such duties are held to different legal requirements than other
members of the working public. For many years a number of states, like California, have
followed the "corporate practice doctrine" precluding the corporate practice of law or
medicine. {See Survey of State Laws Relating to the Corporate Practice of Medicine, D.
Cameron Dobbins, 1997.) The 2002 decision of the California Court of Appeals in
Gafcon, Inc. v. Ponsor & Associates, 98 Cal App. 4th 1388, 120 Cal Rptr.2d 392 contains
a good historical discussion of the corporate practice doctrine, in California and other
states. While Gafcon is not on point for this issues of this appeal, its discussion of the
unique status of members of, "a profession requiring the utmost duties of loyalty and
confidentiality" to client/patients and the need to prevent corporate employers from
interfering with such duties, is highly applicable to the matters at issue.
Gafcon dealt with a situation where all of the members of a law firm were salaried
employees of Travelers Insurance. With the Court finding that the "law firm was a unit
of Travelers Indemnity Companies staff counsel organization and its lawyers were
14

Travelers employees." Id. at 1398. The Gafcon court, noting that there had been some
exceptions recognized to the corporate practice doctrine which allowed a liability
insurance carrier to assign one of its employee/attorneys to represent the insured
provided: (1) there was no conflict of interest; (2) the attorneys must be certain that the
insurance company does not control or interfere with the exercise of professional
judgment in representing insureds; (3) the insurance company cannot receive any
attorneys fees; and (4) the firm name used by in-house counsel is not false, deceptive or
misleading. Id. at p. 1413. See also 1406. The court also held:
It is a well accepted and oft repeated principle that the attorney retained by
the insurance company for the purpose of defending the insured under the
insurance policy owes the same duties to the insured as if the insured had
hired the attorney him or herself, (citations omitted)
Id. at 1406-1407. In addition, it was held:
One of the principle obligations which bind an attorney is that of fidelity,
maintaining inviolate the confidence reposed in him by those who employ
him, and at every peril to himself to preserve the secrets of his client. This
obligation is a very high and stringent one. It is also an attorney's duty to
protect his client in every possible way . . . By virtue of this rule, an
attorney is precluded from assuming any relation which would prevent him
from devoting his entire energies to his client's interests. Nortdoes it matter
that the intention and motives of the attorney are honest. The rule is
designated, not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent
conduct, but as well to protect the honest practitioner from putting himself
in a position where he may be required to choose between conflicting
duties, or be led to an attempt to reconcile conflicting interests, rather than
to enforce to their full extent the rights of the interest which he should alone
represent, (citations omitted)
Id at 1407-1408.
In rendering its decision, the court drew from precedent dealing with the "parallel
doctrine of corporate practice of medicine," stating ". . . the basic rationale of the
15

corporate practice prohibition is the potential for a secondary and divided loyalty to the
patient. Id. at 1407-1408. The Court further observed:
None of those professions which involves a relationship of a personal as
well as a professional character, which has to do with personal privacy, can
be placed in the same category as druggists, architects, or other vocations
where no such relationship exists, (citation omitted)
Id. at 1408. The Gafcon court, while upholding the trial court's ruling that Travelers had
not engaged in the illegal practice of law, it reversed other trial court findings, not
directly on point here. In so doing, it made the following key statement which bears on
this case:
The statement in Coumis is still apt: "No matter how honest the intentions,
counsel cannot discharge inconsistent duties." (citation omitted)
Id at 1419.
As clearly spelled out in both Barbuto I and Barbuto II, physicians owe fiduciary
duties to patients highly valued under Utah law. Barbuto II at p. 617 refers to the
requirement that, "a patient's trust and confidence that disclosures to physicians will be
used solely for the patient's welfare and that a patient's privacy with regard to those
disclosures will be respected and protected." In this case, IHC has taken the position that
a physician's ethical and fiduciary duties simply disappear if the physician is employed
by the defendant corporation. Such argument and actions are not only at odds with those
professional and legal standards, but violate sound public policy as well as both the letter
and the spirit of the Barbuto decisions.
The concerns expressed in the Barbuto decisions apply with even more force when
the physician's patient and the physician's employer are adversaries. Barbuto II, which
16

involved an independent physician, noted the unfair position that allowing ex parte
communications would place the physician in. Id. at 620. Where the physician is
dependent on the patient's adversary for his livelihood, the doctor would be placed in an
impossible position ethically. In the words of the California appellate courts, "no matter
how honest the intentions [a physician] cannot discharge inconsistent duties."

A

physician's legal and ethical duties do not change when he has a corporate employer.
Both the patient and the physician need more, rather than less, protection in that scenario.
Just as in the case of salaried defense attorneys, a large health care organization
should be required to adapt its policies and practices to avoid interfering with its
employed physicians fulfilling their duties to their patients.
B.

Even if a respondeat superior exception were to be added to Barbuto, it
does not justify the ex parte meetings at issue on this appeal.

In this case, Jared Wilson did not claim that the defendant doctors were not
entitled to counsel. Indeed, each of those doctors (none of whom are IHC employees) all
had counsel. Although it might have, Wilson also did not claim that IHC could not meet
with the nurses who were alleged to be negligent.
This appeal involves the ex parte meetings with Drs. Minton, Stoddard, and Boyer,
who treated Jared Wilson after the fact, who were not alleged to have been negligent, for
whom Wilson did not seek to hold IHC vicariously liable, and who were never parties.
(The ex parte meetings with Dr. Clark are also at issue, and are addressed infra)

7

Appellant was, however, prevented from meeting with the nurses.
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As noted in Barbuto II, p. 620 footnote 1, it was entirely appropriate for Mr.
Wilson and the Wilsons7 counsel to meet with Dr. Minton prior to litigation who, at that
time, was prepared to be a key causation witness for his patient Jared. As noted in
Appellant's initial brief, pp. 9-10 and 14, this action was filed because of Dr. Minton's
encouragement and the key causation testimony he stated he would give. There is every
reason to believe that but for the ex parte meetings between Minton and Appellee's
counsel, he would have given the anticipated testimony. It is a matter of record that even
after Barbuto I, Minton met several times with counsel adverse to Jared. Consequently,
Jared was deprived of one of his most important witnesses.
The same is true of Minton's partner, Dr. Stoddard. Through ex parte contact with
Dr. Stoddard that occurred during the November 2008 trial, including a meeting after
Minton was disqualified for his ex parte contact, Dr. Stoddard was turned into an adverse
causation witness against Jared. As outlined on pages 40-41 of Appellant's prior brief,
Dr. Stoddard's testimony changed from having no opinion on causation when he testified
on November 6 to being an adverse causation expert for IHC on November 20.
Dr. Richard Boyer, a non-IHC employee, but a person almost entirely dependent
on IHC for his livelihood, did not treat Jared until several years after his injuries. His
initial and untainted interpretation of the MRI of Jared's brain should have served as key
causation evidence on Jared's behalf However, as set forth in pages 10-13 and 39-40 of
Appellant's prior brief, through ex parte meetings with Dr. Boyer, Appellee's counsel
was able to turn both him and the medical record into key evidence against Jared. Again,
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Jared never claimed that Dr. Boyer was in any way negligent, nor sought to hold IHC
vicariously liable for any such conduct.
C.

Barbuto may not be circumvented by counsel's representing both the
defendant and the physician-witness.

In its brief, IHC argues that Jared waived its Barbuto violations. It is true that
Jared Wilson's counsel did call Drs. Boyer, Minton and Stoddard as adverse witnesses at
the trial. It is not true that in doing so, the Barbuto violations were waived.
Because no notice was given of Dr. Boyer's meeting with IHC's counsel, Jared's
counsel did not learn until years after it had occurred that such change had resulted from
an ex parte meeting. By then, the changed record had become an integral part of Jared's
medical history, had been used by subsequent treating doctors, and had been considered
by all of the experts. Jared's counsel had no choice but to present evidence attempting to
impeach that key document and to impeach Dr. Boyer's objectivity and credibility.
Being forced to try to make the best of a bad situation is not a waiver.
Dr. Minton was called for a very limited purpose, i.e., to lay foundation for Jerrie
Wilson's testimony regarding the occurrence and substance of the meeting at Tony
Roma's restaurant. The trial court had indicated that it would require such foundation
before letting Jerrie Wilson testify on that subject. Calling Dr. Minton for that very
limited purpose could not have been a waiver of unrelated Barbuto violations.
Dr. Stoddard was called as a fact witness, an important part, to deal with the
problems created by IHC's having withheld the mortality and morbidity statistics on
babies born prematurely at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center. And it confirmed what
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Dr. Stoddard had said earlier in his deposition, i.e., that he had no opinion as to the cause
of Jared's brain injuries. Appellee's position that by calling his own treating physicians
for limited purposes, Jared waived any right to claim relief due to their breaches of their
fiduciary duties to him is without merit. The suggestion that where illegal ex parte
meetings take place with the patient's own doctors, the patient is forced to choose
between foregoing the testimony of his own doctors altogether or waiving his rights is
contrary to both fairness and sound public policy.
IHC also argues that the fact that its attorneys indicated at the depositions of
Minton and Stoddard that those witnesses were being represented by IHC's counsel for
purposes of the deposition put Jared Wilson in a position of waiving any rights arising
from Barbuto violations. That is a disturbing proposition. Even if counsel represents two
clients, he or she is not free to communicate or use confidential information learned in
o

one representation for the benefit of a different representation.
Jared Wilson had a right to assume that, absent notice to the contrary, both his
doctors and IHC's counsel would follow the law as pronounced in the Barbuto decisions.
Nevertheless, the meetings continued.

8

The depositions of Drs. Minton and Stoddard were taken June 19, 2003; Dr. Minton's
was February 13, 2004. Barbuto I was issued August 10, 2006. In essence, Appellee is
contending that Appellant waived his rights under both Barbuto decisions before either
were issued - and that such waiver applies not only to the violations occurring before the
dates of those depositions, but to all subsequent violations.
20

D.

The Barbuto rules may not be circumvented by counsel's representing
both the defendant and the physician-witness.

Subsequent to his deposition on February 13, 2004, Dr. Steven Clark left IHC and
took a position with a competing health care provider. (As noted in the Appellant's prior
brief, it was discovered at trial that this parting was less than friendly.) It is now apparent
that IHC became concerned that it could no longer use the "employee justification" for ex
parte meetings with Clark. Also, presumably, IHC had concerns regarding maintaining
control over Clark. Apparently, IHC determined to deal with this concern and the
intervening Barbuto I decision, by arranging for attorney Charles Dahlquist, a long-time
IHC defense attorney, to "represent" Clark.
It was highly unusual to have legal counsel appear in a case on behalf of a nonparty, and both Wilson's counsel and the court were puzzled by it.

The claimed

justification was that for a short period during the pendency of this case an expert that
plaintiff wanted to use, Dr. Greggory DeVore, indicated that he believed Clark to have
been negligent in the limited role that he played in Jared's care.9
DeVore5s designation, however, was short-lived as the defendants were successful
in getting the trial court to disqualify DeVore. (Defense counsel, Jaryl Rencher, claimed
to have retained DeVore early in the case, although he was never paid nor was he ever
designated as a potential witness.
DeVore's replacement, Dr. Barry Schifrin, did not criticize Clark.

Attorney

Dahlquist later withdrew as counsel for Clark and appeared on behalf of IHC. It was not
9

After the Wilson's main liability expert, Dr. John Marshall, had been intimidated into
withdrawing, Wilson designated Dr. Greggory DeVore.
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until statements made by counsel during the opening statement, that Appellant's counsel
realized that counsel had been preparing Clark to give testimony well beyond his role as a
treating physician and to serve as an expert witness against his own patient. As soon as
this was realized, Jared's counsel opposed such inappropriate behavior and sought relief
from the court.
Mr. Dahlquist, who by then was trial counsel for IHC, defended what had occurred
by contending that Clark was his client, and that attorneys can always speak with their
own clients and stated that he was still meeting with Dr. Clark. (R 8607, Tr. p. 0844.)
While there was no apparent need for Clark to have counsel, as he had never been named
as a defendant in the case, it is technically true that it is permissible for anyone to seek
legal counsel on any subject at any time. Consequently, it is assumed, arguendo, that
Clark had the right to legal counsel, regardless of whether he actually needed such
counsel.

However, for counsel to use confidential information elicited in his

representation of Dr. Clark for the benefit in his representation of IHC, directly
adversarial to Dr. Clark's patient, would be patently improper.
The law has long recognized that a party may not do indirectly what it is precluded
from doing directly. It is respectfully submitted that this Court should hold that claiming
an attorney-client relationship may not be used as a means to circumvent Barbuto.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S PRE-TRIAL
REQUESTS FOR THE NEONATAL STATISTICS, BUT DID NOT ERR IN
REQUIRING THEIR PRODUCTION DURING TRIAL.
Early in this case, as it became apparent that IHC's main causation defense was

"prematurity," the plaintiff recognized the critical need for discovery of historical
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information kept by the hospital regarding the outcomes of preterm babies born at the
hospital. Although that information was routinely shared with patients (and had been
shared with the Wilsons prior to Jared's birth), IHC claimed that it was privileged. This
was true even though the keepers of those statistics, Minton and Stoddard, made specific
representations in their depositions concerning those details, which they claimed were in
the statistics. IHC had also used its mortality and morbidity statistics for its newborn
ICUs in a public 2003 Annual Report, "Caring for Our Community." (R 1172-1174.)
On February 8, 2005, the plaintiff brought a motion to compel the production of
this information, arguing that (a) it was not privileged, or (b) any privilege had been
waived (R 1169-1223). On April 22, 2005, the court issued a written ruling finding the
requested information privileged and that, in essence, the privilege could not be waived.
(R 1459-1465.) The court determined that the statute allowed a court no latitude or
discretion.
In light of this ruling, plaintiff, on August 10, 2005, asked the court to strike the
subject statute (U.C.A. § 26-25-3) as unconstitutional. An extensive brief was submitted
detailing how the statute, as interpreted by the trial court, violated the Utah and United
States constitutions, including Art. I, § 11 (the open court's provision) of the Utah
Constitution, as it failed all three prongs of the three part test set forth in Juddv. Drezga,
103 P.3d 135 (Utah 2004), as well as violating the constitutional principles outlined in
Condemarine v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989); Berry v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., Ill P.2d 670 (Utah 1985); Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007 (Utah 2002);
Masich v. United States Smelting Refinery and Mining Co., 191 P.2d 612 (Utah 1948);
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Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993); and Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984).
Appellant reasserts that contention here.
Wilson also asserted, and reasserts here, that the subject statute, as interpreted,
also violates Article V, § 1 (the separation of powers clause) of the Utah Constitution.
(See Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998) (precluding the legislature from removing
flexibility and discretion from state judicial procedure.))
The statute as IHC would interpret it would also violate Article V § 7 (the due
process clause) of the Utah Constitution as well as the due process clause of the federal
constitution (the Fourteenth Amendment.) (See United States v. Richard M. Nixon, 94
S.Ct. 3090, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) and Herbert v. Lando, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 441 U.S. 153
(1979), which applied the Nixon decision to a civil case). This motion was also denied.
Wilson later asked the court to reconsider its denial in light of Cannon v. Salt Lake
Regional Medical Center, Inc., 121 P.3d 74 (UT App. 2005) (indicating that trial courts
do have some flexibility and discretion in deciding claims of privilege under the Peer
Review Statutes) ( R 4432-4446). Although the court indicated on October 23, 2008 that
it would revisit the issue (Hearing Transcript, 10/23/08, p. 179-181), IHC did not give
them to the court for in camera inspection until October 30, the third day of trial. (R
8605, Tr. pp. 0689-0692). It took only a matter of minutes for the court to review them in
camera and order their production (R 8605, Tr. pp. 0689-0692).
While the court did err in its rulings precluding discovery of this key evidence
three years before (with the resulting prejudice to Appellant), its ruling finally requiring
production was correct and should not be overturned.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant Jared Wilson requests that the judgments (including the cost judgment)
against him be reversed, that he be granted a new trial, that IHC's cross appeal be denied,
and for the additional relief requested in his prior brief on page 47 in paragraphs a
through d.

DATED this 14th day of June, 2010.
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